Transmission of foot and mouth disease at the wildlife/livestock interface of the Kruger National Park, South Africa: can the risk be mitigated? by Jori, Ferran & Etter, Eric
Accepted Manuscript
Title: Transmission of foot and mouth disease at the
wildlife/livestock interface of the Kruger National Park, South
Africa: can the risk be mitigated?
Author: Ferran Jori Eric Etter
PII: S0167-5877(16)30033-2
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1016/j.prevetmed.2016.01.016
Reference: PREVET 3964
To appear in: PREVET
Received date: 23-3-2015
Revised date: 3-12-2015
Accepted date: 14-1-2016
Please cite this article as: Jori, Ferran, Etter, Eric, Transmission of foot
and mouth disease at the wildlife/livestock interface of the Kruger National
Park, South Africa: can the risk be mitigated?.Preventive Veterinary Medicine
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.prevetmed.2016.01.016
This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication.
As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript.
The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof
before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process
errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that
apply to the journal pertain.
1 
 
Transmission of foot and mouth disease at the wildlife/livestock interface of 
the Kruger National Park, South Africa: can the risk be mitigated? 
Running title: Risk of FMD at the Kruger National Park interface 
Ferran Jori
1,2,3
, Prof. Eric Etter
1,4*
 eric.etter@cirad.fr 
1UPR AGIRs, CIRAD, 34398 Montpellier, France 
2Department of Zoology and Entomology, University of Pretoria, 0002, South Africa 
3Department of Animal Science and Production, Botswana College of Agriculture, Gaborone, 
Botswana 
4Department of Production Animal Studies, Faculty of Veterinary Science, University of Pretoria, 
Onderstepoort, South Africa. 
*Corresponding author at: Epidemiology Section, Department of Production Animal Studies, Faculty 
of Veterinary Science, University of Pretoria, Private Bag X04, Onderstepoort, 0110, South Africa, 
Tel.: +27 (0)12 529 84 67, Fax: +27 (0)12 529 83 15. 
  
2 
 
Highlights 
 
 Since 2000, the efficacy of foot and mouth disease control at the interface between 
cattle and buffaloes at the edge of the Kruger National Park has deteriorated and 
needs urgent improvement. 
 This quantitative risk assessment allowing to model the risk of FMD virus 
transmission between cattle and buffaloes at the edge of the KNP is based on 
ecological and epidemiological data and fits with past and current numbers of 
outbreaks. 
 Including variability and uncertainty this model could be used as a tool for assessing 
control strategies and may be easily adapted to other transfrontier conservation parks 
in Southern Africa. 
 Examples encompassing vaccination coverage (or efficacy), control of buffaloes’ 
population in the park, control of buffaloes escaping the park are presented and 
discussed. 
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Summary 
In Southern Africa, the African buffalo (Syncerus caffer) is the natural reservoir of foot and mouth disease 
(FMD). Contacts between this species and cattle are responsible for most of the FMD outbreaks in cattle at the 
edge of protected areas, which generate huge economic losses. During the late 1980’s and 90’s, the erection of 
veterinary cordon fences and the regular vaccination of cattle exposed to buffalo contact at the interface of the 
Kruger National Park (KNP), proved to be efficient to control and prevent FMD outbreaks in South Africa. 
However, since 2000, the efficiency of those measures has deteriorated, resulting in an increased rate of FMD 
outbreaks in cattle outside KNP, currently occurring more than once a year. 
Based on retrospective ecological and epidemiological data, we developed a stochastic quantitative model to 
assess the annual risk of FMD virus (FMDV) transmission from buffalo to cattle herds present at the KNP 
interface. The model suggests that good immunization of approximately 75% of the cattle population combined 
with a reduction of buffalo/cattle contacts is an efficient combination to reduce FMDV transmission to one 
infective event every 5.5 years, emulating the epidemiological situation observed at the end of the 20th century, 
before current failure of control measures. The model also indicates that an increasing number of buffalo present 
in the KNP and crossing its boundaries, combined with a reduction in the vaccination coverage of cattle herds at 
the interface, increases 3-fold the risk of transmission (one infective event per year).The model proposed makes 
biological sense and provides a good representation of current knowledge of FMD ecology and epidemiology in 
Southern Africa which can be used to discuss with stakeholders on different management options to control 
FMD at the wildlife livestock interface and updated if new information becomes available. It also suggests that 
the control of FMD at the KNP interface is becoming increasingly challenging and will probably require 
alternative approaches to control this disease and its economic impact. 
 
Keywords: African buffalo; Foot and mouth disease; transmission; risk assessment; modelling; 
Kruger National Park 
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Introduction 
 
Foot and mouth disease (FMD) is considered one of the most important infectious animal diseases in 
the world, mainly because it inflicts severe economic losses due to the restrictions in trade of livestock 
and its products within infected countries (Thompson et al., 2002). In southern Africa, the 
epidemiology of this disease is substantially different than in other regions, mainly due to specific 
circulating strains (SAT1, SAT2 and SAT3) and the role of reservoir played by African buffalo 
(Syncerus caffer) populations (Vosloo et al., 2002; Vosloo and Thomson, 2004). This wild bovid is 
widespread in southern Africa’s protected areas and represents a serious challenge for the control of 
FMD, particularly among cattle living in close proximity to natural habitats of buffalo. During the last 
decades of the 20th century, the implementation of specific control measures in exporting countries in 
the region, such as veterinary cordon fences and regular vaccination of cattle herds exposed to buffalo 
contacts, has managed to limit the occurrence of the disease in the region to less than one outbreak per 
decade. However, since 2000, the region has been experiencing a serious re-emergence of the disease 
(Baipoledi et al., 2004; Jori et al., 2009; Thomson et al., 2013a), with a frequency of at least one 
outbreak per year in areas where the disease was previously under control.  
Epidemiological models are tools that provide useful insights into complex situations associated with 
the management of animal diseases at the wildlife/livestock interface (Miller et al., 2013) and are 
developed to improve our understanding on the effect of external inputs, through representation of the 
interactions between components of a complex system. Such tools can be helpful in discussions with 
(domestic and wild) animal health authorities and managers about the critical pathways of 
transmission and the assessment of different scenarios on disease outcomes in order to guide 
decisions. In that context, the development of stochastic epidemiological models that take into 
account the complex dynamics of FMDV have been modelled in the past, to estimate the risk of FMD 
transmission posed by different wildlife species in Zimbabwe and more recently, to take into account 
landscape heterogeneity, and climatic variability in the transmission of FMDV at the wildlife – 
livestock interface of Kruger National Park (KNP),  (Dion and Lambin, 2012). In our study, we used a 
stochastic approach with the goal of integrating quantitative information of cattle and buffalo 
5 
 
movement across the veterinary cordon fence surrounding the KNP, and using available data 
accumulated by the animal health and wildlife authorities working at the interface of the KNP during 
the last two decades to measure the risk of FMD transmission in that area. The goal of the model was 
to estimate the annual probability of cattle becoming infected with FMDV at the interface of the KNP 
and to compare the impact of several mitigation measures on the annual occurrence of the disease 
during recent years.  
 
Methods 
STUDY AREA 
The study area is the KNP wildlife/livestock interface, described in detail by Jori et al. (2009) and 
other authors (Van Schalkwyk et al., 2014). The KNP and adjacent private wildlife areas, inhabited by 
free-ranging buffalo populations, are recognised as the FMD-infected zones of the country (Figure 1). 
Adjacent to these fenced borders lies the buffer zone, mostly comprising communal farming areas, 
where rural communities graze their cattle and which is divided in two sections: i) a portion directly 
adjacent to the FMD infected zone, where cattle are vaccinated three times a year, referred to as the 
buffer zone with vaccination (BZV), and ii) a second portion adjacent to the BZV, where animals are 
not vaccinated but where increased livestock surveillance and movement control are implemented, 
known as the buffer zone without vaccination (BZNV). Adjacent to the latter is an inspection zone, 
where increased surveillance is implemented through the inspection of domestic livestock every 28 
days. In the infected zone, BZV and BZNV, restrictions on animal movement are also enforced to 
prevent the occurrence and spread of outbreaks among cattle herds, while in the FMD-free zone (rest 
of South Africa), no restrictions are applied. 
 
DEFINITION OF THE RISK AND MODEL FORMULATION 
Since long distance air-borne transmission is extremely unlikely to occur in southern Africa 
(Sutmoller et al., 2000), we considered direct transmission as the main route of FMDV transmission 
between an infected and a susceptible animal.  
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The quantified risk (output of the model) was defined as the annual probability for at least one bovine 
from the BZV becoming infected with FMDV as a result of a contact with an infected wild buffalo 
from the KNP. This probability P(Icbz), was modelled as follows: 
( ) 1 (1 ) cbz
n
cbz cbzP I P    
Where ncbz is the number of cattle in the BZV and Pcbz the probability that one cattle head of this 
population becoming infected with FMDV from a buffalo transmitting virus.  
Since this event can happen through two independent and compatible events, Icbz will be the result of 
the union of two probabilities: the probability (PA) that a bovine gets infected by a buffalo escaping 
from the KNP into the communal grazing areas of the BZV and, the probability (PB) that a bovine 
enters the KNP and becomes infected through contacts with buffalo in the park. According to 
probability laws, the union of PA and PB is equal to the sum of both probabilities minus the product 
of those probabilities (Saporta, 2006). Therefore, Icbz = (PA+PB)-(PA*PB). 
The pathway of events considered in the model is based on a preliminary qualitative risk assessment 
(Jori et al., 2009) illustrated in Figure 2.  
The release assessment considered the annual probability for a buffalo to excrete FMDV. Most young 
buffalo, which are usually born during midsummer (November-February), become infected between 3 
and 6 months of age (Thomson and Bastos, 2004), when maternal antibodies wane (Bengis et al., 
1986). By the time they reach one year of age, almost 90% have been infected and show circulating 
antibodies to the three SAT type viruses (Thomson et al., 1992), and most surveys of buffalo in KNP 
and surrounding protected areas show FMD seroprevalence values that range between 80 and 90% 
(Jori et al., 2014). In the acute stages of infection, young buffalo excrete FMDV in roughly the same 
quantities and by the same routes as infected cattle and become highly contagious (Gainaru et al., 
1986). Within 15 days of infection, the virus can no longer be recovered from the tissues, secretions 
or excretions, with the exception of cells in the pharyngeal mucosa, where the virus may persist for 
extended periods of time, resulting in carrier buffalos (Condy et al., 1985). 
Therefore, the annual probability for a buffalo becoming infected, and excreting FMDV (Pi in Figure 
2) can occur as the result of 3 event probabilities:  
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i) A young weaned buffalo younger than one year is infected and becomes viraemic (P 1.1) 
ii) A young weaned buffalo younger than one year has become infected and becomes a 
carrier, after this period of viraemia (P 1.2.) 
iii) A buffalo older than one year has become a carrier, after becoming infected during the 
first year of his life (P 1.3.) 
As a result of the two different scenarios proposed, PA and PB were assessed on the basis of historical 
data collected by wildlife management authorities and the Veterinary Services from the study area as 
well as from recent published literature (Table I) 
The exposure assessment focused on the probability of livestock becoming infected as a result of 
infectious contacts with excreting buffaloes. Potential scenarios of transmission involving other 
wildlife (antelope) species or small ruminants were not considered in our study since the transmission 
of FMDV from buffalo to cattle is the most common scenario (Jori et al., 2009; Tekleghiorghis et al., 
2014) in the Southern African context, the other domestic and wild species playing a minor role in 
FMD transmission (Jori et al., 2009; Weaver et al., 2013).  
 
DEFINITION OF DISTRIBUTIONS FOR INPUT VARIABLES 
Buffalo population in the KNP (Pop) 
According to the census data produced annually by KNP management authorities, the KNP buffalo 
population almost tripled between 1985 and 2011 (Figure 3). These data were modelled using a 
normal distribution in which µ was the mean population of buffaloes in the KNP between 1985 and 
2005 and σ was the standard deviation of this sample. The same data sources provided the mean 
number of buffalo calves (0-1 year old) per year between 1985 and 2005, which were modelled as 
another normal distribution. The number of adult buffalo was calculated as the difference between the 
total number of buffalo and the number of young. This allowed estimating the probability for a given 
buffalo from the KNP being younger (Py) or older than one year (Pa). 
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Probability for a buffalo to be excreting FMDV (P 1.1) 
In the model, we assumed that infection and potential transmission of the three SAT type viruses 
could occur as three separate processes, as suggested in other similar risk assessments (Sutmoller et 
al., 2000).  For a young buffalo to become infected, it needs to lose the immunity provided by 
maternal antibodies which happens right after the weaning process (Thomson et al., 1992). According 
to the literature (Thomson and Bastos, 2004; Vosloo and Thomson, 2004), we determined that for an 
African buffalo from KNP to excrete FMDV (P1.1.), the following event chain needs to occur: a 
buffalo from KNP needs to be young (probability Py), needs to be weaned (probability Pw), it needs 
to become infected with FMDV (probability Pyi) and it needs to find itself in a period of vireamia 
after the infection (Pe).  
 P1.1.=Py*Pw*Pyi*Pe     
Details on the calculation of prevalence and excretion of FMDV depending on the age of weaning and 
the days of viraemia can be found in Table I and Appendix I of Supplementary material.  
 
Probability for a buffalo to be carrier of FMDV (Pc) 
After the viraemic period, FMDV can still be isolated from the oropharyngeal fluid in a small 
proportion of individuals defined as carriers (Moonen and Schriver, 2000). Therefore, we 
distinguished two types of buffalo carriers that we named young and adult carriers, depending on their 
age (before or after the first year of life) and we defined P1.2 and P1.3 as the probabilities for a 
buffalo to be a young carrier and an adult carrier, respectively.  
We defined the as P1.2 (probability for a buffalo to be young and carrier) was calculated as the 
product of the probability for a given buffalo being younger than one year (Py), the probability to be 
weaned, the probability of a buffalo becoming infected during the second 6 months of life (Pyi), the 
probability of this animal not being in the period of viraemia (1-Pe) and the probability of being a 
carrier (Pc): 
         
(     )
  
 
       (        )       
      
 (    )     
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In the same manner,  P1.3. (the probability for buffalo to be adult and carrier) was calculated  as the 
product of the probability to be older than one year (Pa) by the probability for an adult to be infected 
(Prad), and by the probability for an infected buffalo becoming a carrier (Pc ). We consider that 
infected adult buffalo results of infection during the first year of age, or do not become infected 
  P1.3.= Pa * Prad * Pc 
Additional details of the calculation of these probabilities are given in Appendix II of the 
supplementary material. 
 
Probability of buffaloes escaping from KNP (Pbcf) 
The annual number of buffaloes escaping from the KNP was obtained from historical data recorded 
between 2002 and 2007 by the National Veterinary Services and wildlife authorities, operating 
outside and inside the KNP, respectively. We did not take into account the data from 2000 and 2001 
because those years experienced massive buffalo evasions due to exceptionally high rainfall and were 
subsequently considered as rare events (Bruckner et al., 2002; Jori et al., 2009; Van Schalkwyk et al., 
2014). Therefore, the average number of stray buffalo escaping from KNP during that period was 
evaluated at 70 individuals per year. We assumed that in the absence of those rare events, the 
probability for a buffalo to escape from the KNP was proportional to the total KNP buffalo population 
size and performed a logistic regression to obtain a model of this probability. Then, out of the same 
set of data, we calculated the probability for an adult buffalo (Pcaf) or a young buffalo (Pcyf) to cross 
the fence (See supplementary material, Appendix III). 
In summary, assuming that becoming infected and crossing the fence were two independent events, 
the release assessment of virus outside the KNP considered the 3 following probabilities: 
 Release probability outside the KNP for a young excreting buffalo P1 
P1=P1.1.*Pcyf 
 Release probability outside the KNP for a young carrier buffalo P2 
P2=P1.2.*Pcyf 
 Release probability outside the KNP for a adult carrier buffalo P3 
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P3= P1.3.*Pcaf 
 
  Probability for an individual bovine head to be in contact with buffalo outside the KNP (Pcoo). 
The numbers of cattle in the BZV were modelled as a livestock population ranging from 70 000 to 
100 000 head based on the different data found in the literature and provided by the National 
Veterinary authorities outside the KNP (Brahmbhatt et al., 2012; Stevens et al., 2007).  
The probability of cattle and buffalo being in close proximity outside the KNP was calculated using 
data gathered through a questionnaire performed among 113 cattle farmers from a specific location 
adjacent to the KNP fence in October 2007 (Abu Samra et al., 2012). Contact was defined as the fact 
of buffalo and cattle being in a common area measuring approximately the size of 0.7 ha. On that 
occasion, 30 out of 113 farmers declared having observed buffalo in their grazing area and 18 of them 
declared having seen the two species in contact and gave an indication of the time of contact observed 
(Abu Samra et al., 2012). We used this information to model the probability of observing a contact 
(Pcoo). To take into account that contacts could occur between one buffalo and several individuals of 
a cattle herd, we considered the probability for a single buffalo to be in contact with at least one 
animal of the herd through the following formula: 
       (       )
    
where Pcooh was the probability for a single buffalo to be in contact with a cattle herd and nch the 
average size of a cattle herd modeled as a lognormal distribution and standard deviation of the cattle 
herd size observed in the study area where the questionnaire was implemented (cf. Table 1).  
The time of contact observed by farmers in minutes was reported as maximum and minimum time 
intervals and was modelled as a uniform distribution between these values for each reported interval. 
The mean time of contact was modelled as a discrete distribution in which the uniform distribution of 
each time interval was considered a possible value and was combined with the probability weight 
provided by the proportion of farmers having reported this time interval (Vose, 2004). 
 
Probability for an individual bovine head to be in contact with buffalo inside the KNP (Pcoi). 
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The questionnaire implemented among 113 small scale farmers outside the KNP (Abu Samra et al., 
2012), gathered data about the number of farmers (n=13) that declared taking their livestock inside the 
KNP for drinking several days a year. We assessed the probability of one bovine entering the KNP as 
a Beta distribution (r+1; n-r+1) in which “r” represented the total number of events i.e. the number of 
days per year that farmers declared driving their cattle into the KNP for drinking and “n” represented 
the total number of days that this event could have occurred in one year (Vose 2004). The probability 
of cattle and buffalo becoming in contact in the KNP was gathered by a questionnaire implemented 
among fence workers to assess the permeability of the 70% of the KNP Western boundary veterinary 
fence (Jori et al., 2011). This data set allowed us to quantify the number of days that every fence 
worker reported the observation of contacts during the previous year (r), and the number of possible 
days that this event could have been observed by the totality of persons interviewed (n). We then used 
a Beta distribution, as described above, to model this parameter. The mean time of contact between 
buffalo and cattle inside the KNP as reported by KNP fence workers (Jori et al., 2011), was modelled 
as a discrete distribution of each observed time interval. To take into account the occurrence of 
contacts between several individuals of each herd (buffalo and cattle) at water sources in the KNP, we 
calculated the probability for an individual from a cattle herd to come into contact with at least one 
individual of the buffalo herd when they would come across each other, Pcoi, using the following 
formula: 
       (       )
   
where Pcoih represented the probability for an individual bovine to be in contact with a buffalo herd 
and nh the average buffalo herd size modeled as a lognormal distribution obtained from KNP buffalo 
census data. 
PROBABILITY OF DISEASE TRANSMISSION AFTER CONTACT BETWEEN BUFFALO AND CATTLE (Pt) 
The probability of transmitting FMDV following a contact between buffalo and cattle was calculated 
differently for a young (Ptyc) or adult carrier (Ptac) buffalo and for an excreting buffalo (Ptye). For 
carriers, we used the transmission rate parameter quantified by Tenzin et al. (2008), estimated at 
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0.0148 infections per month (likelihood-based confidence interval: 0.004625–0.0341). This variable 
was calculated from published experiments with buffalo and other domestic ruminants and the authors 
found no difference in the risk incurred by a domestic or wild FMDV carrier. We considered the 
transmission rate for a young excreting buffalo to be 100% efficient as observed in experimental cattle 
infections (Orsel et al., 2007; Orsel et al., 2005). Since conditions in the field are different than in 
experimental conditions and the SAT strains are different from the O strains used in these experiments 
(Orsel et al., 2007; Orsel et al., 2005), we conditioned this rate of transmission to the time of contact. 
Therefore, for times of contact longer than 6 hours, we considered a transmission of 100% and for 
contacts of 6 hours or shorter we assumed that transmission only occurred in 50% of the cases. 
Concerning the susceptibility of cattle to infection through a contact with an excreting buffalo, we 
considered that vaccinated livestock were protected against FMDV infection in 100% of cases, while 
non-vaccinated cattle were entirely susceptible. The vaccination coverage of the cattle population in 
the BZV was modeled using a normal distribution according to the reports of vaccination campaigns 
provided by the official Veterinary Services operating in the BZV between 1996 and 2006, which 
ranged between 64% and 86%. 
 
MODEL ENVIRONMENT AND SOFTWARE 
The model was run 10,000 times using a Latin Hypercube simulation using the software package 
@Risk (@Risk version 5.5.0 Professional edition, 2009, © Palisade Corporation, 31 Decker Road, 
Newfield, NY) add-in for Microsoft Excel (© Microsoft Office Professional Edition, 2010).  
 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND MODEL EXPERIMENTATION 
To identify which inputs had the greatest effect on the variation of the final output and to assess the 
possible effects of variability and uncertainty of the input data on the model outcomes, a sensitivity 
analysis using least-squares regression coefficients was performed. Based on previous literature on 
risk assessment models (Martinez-Lopez et al., 2008; Mur et al., 2012), we considered regression 
coefficients (β) with values higher than 0.1, having a significant influence in the final output of the 
model.  
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In addition, in order to experiment further with the model and assess its sensitivity to the most 
common control strategies of FMD, we ran different scenarios modifying key input parameters such 
as i) the number of buffalo escaping from KNP to simulate potential changes in fence permeability or 
ii) the number of buffaloes living in the KNP to simulate an increase in the buffalo population, iii) the 
number of animals vaccinated to simulate changes in vaccine efficiency and vi) a combination of 
those scenarios. The value of each of those parameters was systematically varied in 5 steps using 5000 
iterations/step from minimum and maximum values, while keeping constant all other variables at their 
base values.  
 
Results 
Numeric probabilities of the model with 90% confidence intervals are provided in Table 2. In general, 
the probabilities for any category of buffalo crossing the KNP fence were very low. The mean annual 
probability for a buffalo to be an FMD carrier and to leave the KNP (adult or young) was estimated at 
240*10-5 while the mean annual probability for a buffalo to be young, excreting FMDV and leaving 
the KNP was 3.6*10-5. This suggests that it is approximately 67 times more likely for a buffalo to be 
carrier and to leave the KNP than for a young buffalo to be viraemic, excreting FMD virus and 
crossing the KNP fence.  
Considering a good vaccination coverage of 75% in the cattle population at the BZV, a buffalo 
population with a mean value of 23 400 individuals and an average of 70 buffalo escaping from the 
KNP annually, the mean annual risk of having at least one bovine infected by buffalo outside the KNP 
(PA) was a probability of 0.08 [0.002; 0.34]95% (Figure 4a), while the mean probability of a bovine 
being infected by entering the KNP (PB) was 1.25 times higher (0.11 [0.031; 0.236]95%) (Figure 4b). 
Nevertheless the variation of PA is 1.5 higher than the variation of PB meaning that the combination of 
uncertainty and variability is higher for PA. The combined risk of both events (the probability of at 
least one bovine becoming infected at the KNP interface) was 0.18 [0.043; 0.481] (Figure 4c). This 
mean value suggests that a transmission from buffalo to cattle in the circumstances described above 
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(which are similar to the epidemiological background in the study area before the year 2000) would 
occur on average once every 5.5 years. 
 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
The results of the crude sensitivity analysis are shown in Figure 4d.  The parameters having the 
greatest impact on the variation in the risk of transmission were the age of infection of young buffalo 
(r=0.43), the parameters of the logistic regression linking the KNP buffalo population and the number 
of animals escaping (r=0.32 and r=0.34), the number of days of viraemia for infected buffalo (r=0.23), 
the probability for a young buffalo to leave the KNP (r=0.21) and the time of contact (r=0.17).  
SCENARIO PLAYING 
Scenario playing permitted to fix some parameters with a high uncertainty and to explore specifically 
their impact on the variation of the final probability. Scenario playing provided evidence that the 
model is sensitive to the parameters representing the control strategies for FMD in the region, such as 
veterinary cordon fences and vaccination (Figure 5a). The effects of a KNP buffalo population 
increase up to a level of 45 000 individuals (comparable to the KNP buffalo population in 2014) 
increased the compiled risk 1.7-fold, representing one transmission incident every 3.3 years (Figure 
5a). The second scenario represented the possible impact of changes in the number of escaped of 
buffaloes from 70 to 750 individuals; in such a case of a massive escape of buffaloes as it could occur 
in case of year with high rainfall causing numerous floods, the compiled risk also increased 1.7-fold 
(Figure 5a). The third scenario simulated the impact of a reduction in vaccination coverage to 25% 
(Figure 5a), in which the risk increased 2.2-fold. When we combined all 3 events together with the 
most unfavourable values of these parameters, the calculated risk increased 3.4 times with respect to 
the original output, representing one transmission incident every year (Figure 5b). 
 
Discussion 
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Considering the increasing importance of wildlife reservoirs in the epidemiology of infectious animal 
diseases, studies that integrate ecological and epidemiological data to estimate pathogen transmission 
at the wildlife livestock interface are instrumental to explore potential management or control 
strategies (Miller et al., 2013). Recently, some authors have developed sophisticated spatially explicit 
models to assess the risk of FMDV outbreaks outside KNP. Those models took into account 
landscape heterogeneity and spatially represented contacts between buffaloes and cattle essentially 
outside the KNP interface (Dion and Lambin, 2012; Dion et al., 2011). Our model is different since i) 
it simplified the KNP interface landscape as a whole homogenous unit and ii) integrated more detailed 
information on FMDV transmission between buffalo and cattle based on updated available literature 
and data.  
Our model shows that at individual level and based on available published literature, the probability 
for a carrier buffalo (either young or adult) to transmit FMD to a susceptible bovine is extremely low 
while transmission between young excreting animals and a susceptible bovine are 95 times more 
likely to occur. In other words, the probability for a young excreting buffalo to infect cattle is 
comparatively much more important mainly due to the very low transmission rate of carrier buffalo.   
Our model also suggests that, based on data from localised questionnaires, interactions between cattle 
and buffalo are 1.25 times more likely to occur inside the KNP when cattle herds enter or drinking 
and share water sources with buffalo herds than when small groups of buffalo escape from the KNP 
and roam in communal grazing lands interacting with cattle. The main difference is that contacts 
between buffalo and cattle herds around water sources inside KNP should allow a larger number of 
domestic and wild individuals to interact with each other, increasing the probability of transmission 
between individuals whereas outside KNP, contacts mostly occur between one or two escaped 
buffaloes (Van Schalkwyk et al., 2014) and scattered herds of grazing cattle. From that perspective, a 
realistic option to mitigate the risk of FMD emergence would be to influence communal farmer’s 
behaviour to prevent cattle herds from getting inside the KNP. According to the model, if these 
management options would achieve to reduce by two the probability of a cattle head entering the 
KNP, the overall risk of FMD transmission to cattle would be reduced by 30% (data not shown). 
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One of the main challenges in the development of epidemiological models in natural populations 
often results from a limited understanding of how contact between wildlife and livestock occurs and 
how it leads to effective pathogen transmission (Lloyd-Smith et al., 2009). The assumptions under 
which the model was constructed are described in detail in the supplementary material section 
(Appendix IV). However, a fundamental assumption in the model was that FMD transmission 
between cattle and buffalo could occur if they shared the same environment within a specific space 
and for a certain amount of time. The maximum space frame considered for a contact to occur in the 
different questionnaires implemented (Abu Samra et al., 2012; Jori et al., 2011) being the size of a 
local soccer field (approximately 0.7 ha) and the time window considered for a contact ranging 
between 30 min and 1 day were considered plausible scenarios. 
Some of the inputs based on a limited number of observations and thus, modelled integrating an 
important level of uncertainty, could have influenced the variation of the final estimated risk (Figure 
4D). The sensitivity analysis reflected this influence with some parameters such as the ones of the 
logistic regression heavily influencing the variation of the results. The high impact of the uncertainty 
linked with the parameters of the logistic regression on the final variation explained also the 
difference in the range of the confidence interval between PA (Probability of a bovine becoming 
infected outside KNP) , which includes a logistic regression formula, and PB (Probability of a bovine 
becoming infected inside KNP)for which the logistic regression formula is not included. Therefore the 
comparison between PA and PB should be interpreted with caution. Other parameters such as the age 
of infection or the number of days of viraemia, are influenced by a high variability, which is clearly 
not reducible. In the model, according to field data from KNP (Thomson et al., 1992), we considered 
that animals became infected by all three SAT types before the age of one year. We assumed those 
three infections occurred as separate events, which increased by three the time of vireamia in days 
(Sutmoller et al., 2000). In the unlikely case, that these three infection processes would occur at the 
same time, the risk of transmission would be reduced by two (data not shown).  The probability for a 
young buffalo to leave the park differs due to the variation between the numbers of animal escaping 
observed on different years.  This variation is equally influenced by variability (different animals with 
different behaviour from one year to the other and different observers between years) and uncertainty 
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(due to the fact that this parameter is an extrapolation of a survey done on a part of the fence). The 
variation on the time of contact is influenced by uncertainty due to the scarce number of observed 
contacts that we extrapolated to the whole population of animals, which could potentially interact. 
However, our model is adaptable and has the capacity to integrate new information on some of the 
inputs when it becomes available. 
The work presented here illustrates well the multifactorial nature of FMD re-emergence at the 
interface of the KNP and the results are well validated by historical data of reported FMD outbreaks 
from the study area. The model clearly shows that with good immunity of cattle herds and a limitation 
in the number of contacts between cattle and buffalo, the mean risk of transmission can be reduced 
from 1 transmission event /year to 1 event every 5.5 years (mean of the risk distribution = 0.18). This 
matches well with the limited number of outbreaks (only two between 1987 and 1999) reported in the 
literature (Bruckner et al., 2002; Jori et al., 2009; Thomson et al., 2013a), when the implementation of 
veterinary fences and bi-annual vaccination of cattle at the BZV successfully mitigated FMD 
occurrence. However, since the year 2000, the number of outbreaks at the KNP interface has 
increased almost 5-fold, with at least 14 reported outbreaks between then and 2014 (Figure 1). Our 
model shows how several ecological or management factors (increase of wildlife populations, 
combined with a reduction in the immunization of cattle) could have contributed to an increase in the 
risk of FMD transmission. Populations of elephants and buffaloes in KNP have been increasing 
exponentially since the mid-1990s and are nowadays higher than ever in KNP history (Figure 3). This 
abundance of buffaloes in the KNP is likely to increase the quantity of virus available and the number 
of animals likely to cross the park boundaries in case of fence damage, thereby increasing the 
probability of an infected (excreting or carrier) buffalo escaping its natural habitat and establishing an 
infective contact with susceptible cattle. Veterinary fences were specifically developed to prevent 
those contacts (Thomson et al., 2003) and their success in mitigating FMD transmission during the 
last two decades has promoted their spread across other countries in southern Africa, despite a highly 
controversial impact on wildlife populations (Woodroffe et al., 2014). In addition, although not 
integrated directly in the model, the increase of elephant populations in the KNP (Figure 3), 
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considered as one of the major causes of fence damage in the KNP (Jori et al., 2011; Jori et al., 2009). 
Therefore a reduction of elephant population is likely to decrease the number of fence gaps, reducing 
the number of escaped buffalo and the potential disease transmission to cattle in the BZV. Some 
control of elephant populations based on culling has been implemented in the past (Van Aarde et al., 
1999). Similarly, the model equally suggests that a decrease in the number of buffaloes by 50% would 
reduce the risk of FMD transmission by two fold (Figure 5a). However, culling of large mammals is 
highly controversial; current KNP management options do not include this possibility in the short 
term and largely rely on the removal of artificial water supplies (Lange, 2008). Therefore, since 
substantial buffalo and elephant declines are unlikely to occur in the short term, it is likely that 
infectious contacts between buffalo and livestock at the interface of the KNP will increase 
progressively with the growth of those large mammal populations.  
Although the possibility of controlling and eventually eradicating FMD with existing vaccines has 
been demonstrated in Europe and large parts of South America, this achievement is utopic in southern 
Africa due to the high genetic variability within and between the SAT serotypes circulating in buffalo 
populations (Bastos et al., 2003; Tekleghiorghis et al., 2014; Vosloo et al., 2005) and due to the large 
buffalo populations remaining in the southern African region. During the late 1980’s and 1990’s in 
South Africa, this challenge was met through the production of vaccines synthesized from strains 
collected directly from KNP buffalo populations, which ensured better matching and protection of 
cattle against potential exposure of FMDV strains circulating at the interface. This measure, combined 
with a good prevention of wildlife/cattle physical contacts, resulted in successful control of FMD, 
confirmed by absence limited number of reported FMD outbreaks during that period (Thomson et al., 
2013a) an is confirmed by other model.  
However South Africa stopped its national vaccine production at the beginning of the 21st century. 
Since then, currently used vaccines in southern Africa are produced by a single manufacturer out of a 
pool of viruses which are not specific against KNP strains. This results in commercial vaccines that 
are less efficient against circulating strains than those used a decade ago (Thomson et al., 2013a), 
undoubtedly contributing to FMD re-emergence in the Southern African region. In our model, since 
data on the efficiency of vaccines was not available, we simplified this issue by assuming that the 
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vaccine was 100% efficient, and used the rate of vaccination coverage in the herd as a proxy of 
vaccine efficiency. Therefore, changes in the efficiency of vaccination were simulated through a 
variation in the herd vaccination coverage. 
The production of more efficient vaccines, produced out of KNP circulating strains could potentially 
improve the situation, but in practice this option becomes expensive and commercially unrealistic at a 
regional scale. In addition, the lack of benefits for communal farmers living at the KNP interface 
would remain an issue likely to impact on the vaccination coverage of the herds and the 
immunological control of the disease. This progressive deterioration in the control of the disease also 
seems to be the trend in other countries in the region, with devastating economic losses for the beef 
industry and limited prospects for reverting the situation in the mid term. In addition, the increasing 
development of transfrontier conservation areas (TFCA’s) in southern Africa will facilitate more 
contacts between buffalo and cattle and complicate attempts to reduce the number of FMD outbreaks 
(Tekleghiorghis et al., 2014; Thomson et al., 2013a). This situation justifies the need to explore 
alternative solutions to the problem. One of such alternatives that is progressively gaining acceptance, 
is the implementation of the commodity based trade concept, consisting of the production and trade of 
safe, FMDV-free manufactured beef commodities, despite their being produced in FMD infected 
areas (Thomson et al., 2013aThomson et al., 2013a; Thomson et al., 2013b; Weaver et al., 2013). If 
this concept is successfully applied in southern Africa, it has the potential to reduce the challenge of 
wildlife-livestock cohabitation at the interface of protected areas. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1: Map of the study area showing the number of FMD outbreaks that occurred between 1990 
and 2010. 
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Figure 2: Event pathway of transmission of FMDV between buffalo and cattle at the 
wildlife/livestock interface of KNP with Pi = P1.1+P1.2+P1.3 
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Figure 3: Trends in the buffalo and elephant population in KNP between 1995 and 2011 showing an 
increase of more than 100% during that period  (Source: SanParks) 
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Figure 4: Model outputs for the different scenarios of transmission at the wildlife/livestock interface 
of the KNP. Annual probability of buffalo to cattle transmission A) outside and B) inside the KNP, C) 
Combined probabilities taking into account both scenarios and D) Crude sensitivity analysis showing 
correlation coefficients of inputs having a major influence in the final output. Only correlation 
coefficients > 0.1 are shown. 
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Figure 5: A) Scenario playing showing mean annual risk for FMDV transmission if the herd 
immunity changes between 25% and 80%, KNP buffalo population changes between 20 000 to 
60 000 individuals, and if the annual probability for a buffalo escaping from the KNP changes 
between 0.003 (70 animals escaping per year) and 0.021 (500 animals escaping per year). B) Risk 
distribution when playing all the worst scenarios of the previous values together. 
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Tables 
Table I: Inputs (distributions and values) used in the model with their respective sources of information. 
Notation Definition Distribution type, @Risk Function and 
calculated values applied in the model 
Source 
Pop Number of buffalo in the KNP 
Normal Distribution 
RiskNormal(m, s) 
m=23377, s=5293 
KNP Census Data (1985-2005) 
ncbz Number of cattle in the buffer zone of 
KNP 
Pert Distribution  
RiskPert(min,most_likely,max) 
min=70000, most likely= 85000, max= 100000 
Jori et al., 2009  
Brahmbatt et al, 2010 
Stevens et al., 2007 
Aw Age of weaning for a young buffalo 
Pert Distribution 
 RiskPert(min,most_likely,max) 
min=6, most likely= 8, max=12 
Bengis et al., 1986 
Pr0-6 Prevalence of FMD in buffalo younger 
than 6 months reflecting maternal 
antibodies 
Beta distribution  
RiskBeta(α1, α2) 
α1 =42, α2=4 
Thomson et al, 1992 
Pr6-12 Prevalence of FMD in young buffalo from 
6-12 months 
Beta distribution  
RiskBeta(α1, α2) 
α1 =20, α2=4 
Thomson et al, 1992 
Py Proportion of young buffalo in the 
KNP 
Normal Distribution 
RiskNormal(m, s) 
m=0.117, s= 0.027 
Buffalo census, KNP (1995-2005) 
V Viraemia in days in buffalo infected 
by 3 SAT types at different periods 
during year 1 
Pert Distribution, RiskPert 
(min,most_likely,max) 
min=1, most likely= 3, max=5 
3 * Pert (1, 3, 5) 
Gainaru et al. 1986  
Thomson et al, 1992 
Sutmoller et al., 2000 
 
Pc Probability for an excreting buffalo 
becoming a carrier 
Pert Distribution, 
RiskPert (min,most_likely,max) 
min=0.17, most likely= 0.6, max=0.7 
Vosloo et al., 2007 
nbcf Number of buffalo crossing the 
fence/year 
Normal Distribution 
RiskNormal(m, s)  
m=86.87, s=33 
Department of Agriculture 2002-
2007 
Pycf Proportion of  young buffalo crossing 
the KNP fence 
Normal Distribution 
RiskNormal(m, s)  
m=0.16, s=0.09 
Mpumalanga Veterinary Services, 
2002-2006 
Pcoo Probability of contact cattle buffalo 
in the BZV 
Beta distribution  
RiskBeta(α1, α2)  
α1 =19, α2=964 
Abu Samra, et al.2012 
nch Cattle herd size in the BVZ Lognormal Distribution 
RiskLognorm(m,s) 
m=15.548, s=13.94) Truncated(0;60)) 
Abu Samra, et al.2012 
Pcoih Probability of contact cattle buffalo 
inside KNP 
Beta distribution  
RiskBeta(α1, α2) 
α1=372, α2=8390 
Jori et al., 2011 
Tc Time of contact between buffalo and 
cattle outside the KNP (mns) 
Discrete Distribution 
RiskDiscrete({xi},{pi}) 
x1=360, x2=720, x3=360 
p1=0,3. p2=0,4, p3=0,3 
Abu Samra, et al.2012 
Vc Vaccination coverage in cattle from 
Mpumalanga Province 
Normal Distribution 
RiskNormal(m, s) 
m=0.754545, s=0.0665 
Department of Agriculture 2002-
2007, Mpumalanga Veterinary 
Services (1996-2006). 
Tr Transmission rate for carrier animals 
infections/carrier/month 
Pert Distribution, 
RiskPert (min,most_likely,max) 
min=0.004625; most likely=0.0148, 
maximum0.0341 
Tenzin et al., 2008 
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nh Buffalo herd size inside the KNP Lognormal Distribution 
RiskLognorm(m,s) 
m=44.164, s=237.64) Truncated (0;480)) 
KNP Census Data (1985-2005) 
PcatKNP  Probability of cattle entering the KNP Beta distribution  
RiskBeta(α1, α2) 
α1 =22543, α2=601974 
Abu Samra et al., 2012 
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Table II: Different outputs of interest calculated with the model showing the mean value and the 90% confidence interval after running 10000 iterations 
(Latin Hypercube sampling). 
Name Mean Confidence interval 
(90%) 
Probability for a young buffalo to cross the fence (Pycf ) 0.0108 [3 10-4; 0.0414] 
Probability for an adult buffalo to cross the fence (Pacf ) 0.0065  [3 10-4; 0.0235]  
Probability of contact between a buffalo and a susceptible cattle outside KNP(Pcoo). 0.005 [0.001; 0.013]  
Probability of contact between a buffalo and a susceptible cattle inside KNP (Pcoi). 0.007 [0.04-0.03] 
Probability for a buffalo to be young, excreting FMDv and to cross the fence (P1) 3.6 10-5 [6.96 10-7; 1.4 10-4] 
Probability for a buffalo to be young, carrier FMDv and to cross the fence (P2) 2 10-4 [4.4 10-6; 7.3 10-4] 
Probability for a buffalo to be an adult carrier FMDv and to cross the fence (P3) 0,0022 [1 10-4; 0.008] 
Probability of transmission between a young excreting FMDv buffalo and susceptible attle outside the park cell (Ptye) 1.4 10
-6 [2.7 10-8; 5.1 10-6] 
Probability of transmission between a young carrier FMDv buffalo and a susceptible cattle outside the KNP (Ptyc) 7.5 10
-6 [1.6 10-7; 2.8 10-5] 
Probability of transmission between an adult carrier FMDv buffalo and susceptible cattle (Ptac) 8.6 10
-5 [4 10-6; 3.2 10-4] 
Annual Probability of at least one cattle head to become infected in the KNP (PA) 0.11 [0.031; 0.24] 
Annual Probability of at least one cattle head to become infected  in the BZV outside the KNP (PB) 0.08 [0.002; 0.34] 
Annual probability for at least one cattle becoming infected at the KNP wildlife/livestock interface(P(Icbz) 0.18 [0.045; 0.47] 
 
